3 and Table S1). Moreover, a high number of wins and high sunk costs (money lost in the auction) decreased the probability to change preferences. The second pattern that emerged Lumacaftor chemical structure was characterized by factors that affected the probability to change differently (different sign or low/high parameter estimates) for increases or decreases in preference. Here,

we focus on the most notable effect: the difference between the first and last bids within one player (DFL) and its interaction with the sum of wins and losses (WL). The single fixed effect of DFL is negative and twice as large for increasing as for decreasing preference changes. That is, players that increased their bids over the course of the experiment (DFL < 0) have a higher likelihood to increase their preferences (Fig. 3 and Table S1). The interaction between DFL and WL for decreasing preference changes is positive whereas the same effect for increasing preference changes is negligible. That is, players who win often and consequently decrease their bids (DFL > 0) manifest a higher likelihood of decreasing their preferences (Figs. 3 and S1). Our findings highlight a bidirectional influence between competitive social interactions and individuals’ preferences.

We show that high competition increased preference and low competition decreased preferences. Crucially, the dynamics during the auction had a profound effect on these preference changes, which occurred mainly when participants initially bid more than their competitor. The successive evolution of bids then determined whether players AZD2281 cost increased or decreased their preference. With

constant or increasing bids over the course of the auction participants increased their preference. By contrast, when competition allowed a decrease of bids, accompanied by a high number of wins throughout the auction, participants preferred this item less. That is, participants paid less than anticipated for a desired item, which resulted in a lower preference rank. We further observed that participants did not reduce their bids to a minimum, i.e. initial value of the competitor plus some small amount. They were only able (-)-p-Bromotetramisole Oxalate to realize a reduction from the initial difference of approximately 40–60 % towards their final bids (Fig. 2). On preference level 3 this resulted mainly from an increase in the bids of the other participant. On preference level 2 there was no significant increase of participants’ bids towards the bid of a competitor who bid for the item on preference level 4. There was, however, also no general reduction and eight participants showed an increase in bids of over 25 points (Fig. 2). One possible interpretation is that, even though this was achieved at considerable costs, participants were unwilling to surrender the item at low cost to the competitor and thus preventing a “good deal” for their opponent.